Part of revitalizing the classical legal tradition, as Ius & Iustitium proposes to do, is recovering the classical conception of the science of law, traditionally named Jurisprudence, which was defined by the Roman jurist Ulpian as “divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia” (“the awareness of divine and human affairs, the science of what is just and what is unjust”) (Digest I, I, 10, § 2). The part of the classical view that we want to focus on here is the idea that Jurisprudence is a subaltern science, that is, a science epistemologically ordered to other, higher sciences.
This subalternation explains how, on the classical conception, the law is structurally arrayed at the service of metaphysically and theologically rich conceptions of the common good. We may dispense with the vulgar notion that political or judicial mandarins must “put” an otherwise neutral tool called “law” at the service of some external end of their choosing, which may or may not happen to coincide with our own preferences. The truth is that the law, properly understood, is formally ordered to an objective end, the common good, by virtue of its own rational nature. Thus, in order to be epistemologically consistent, classical Jurisprudence understands itself to be intrinsically ordered to the higher sciences that study that objective end.
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