Dobbs and the Illusion of Neutrality

The parties’ briefs are in, oral argument is concluded, and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization is submitted to the Court for decision. The justices will convene today for their initial votes on the case, but the behind-the-scenes wrangling has likely only just begun. In the meantime, we wait.

From our perspective here at Ius & Iustitium, the oral argument provided good news and bad news. The good news is that Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett did not appear interested in a “compromise” that upheld Mississippi’s 15 week ban on abortion (with exceptions for health of the mother) but left the constitutional right to abortion in place. Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly raised such a position in questioning, but neither Kavanaugh nor Barrett touched on it, and the parties themselves dismissed it. Mississippi Solicitor General Scott Stewart stuck to the position of overruling Roe and Casey completely, while the clinic’s counsel Julie Rikelman refused to budge from viability as the only “logical” point at which a state could prohibit a woman from aborting her unborn child. While perhaps somewhat surprising as a litigation strategy, it is probably the right call. As Sherif Gergis has been arguing for months, any rule that attempts to uphold the Mississippi law while also preserving some constitutional right to an abortion would only be more incoherent and indefensible as constitutional law than the status quo. Perhaps the liberal justices may persuade Roberts and one other justice to take that position behind closed doors, but at oral argument that seemed unlikely. Thus, the only question that would remain is whether at least two of Roberts, Kavanaugh and Barrett will agree with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch that Roe must go, and stare decisis does not save it.

The bad news is that the kabuki theatre of originalist jurisprudence failing to account for the immorality of hundreds of thousands of aborted children every year remained firmly in place. Stewart suggested this gruesome fact was just a “hard question” that should be left to the people to legislate. Meanwhile, the position that unborn children are persons under the 14th Amendment, so ably presented in originalist form by John Finnis, Robert George, Joshua Craddock, and others both before the Court in amici briefs and in more popular forums, was raised only to be dismissed. Justice Kavanaugh—himself a self-proclaimed originalist—sought Stewart’s confirmation that he was not arguing the Supreme Court “somehow has the authority to itself prohibit abortion or that this Court has the authority to order the states to prohibit abortion,” and Stewart promptly agreed. No, fetal personhood is not on the table now, only a seeming “neutrality” that will result in a patchwork of state laws ranging from complete abortion bans to abortion at will through full term of the pregnancy.

On the one hand, as previously discussed here last spring, that is probably the strategically correct decision for Stewart right now. The Court as currently constituted does not have 5 votes for fetal personhood. Even so, the fact that fetal personhood is actually a credibly presented alternative option this time could be the difference between failure in Casey and success in Dobbs. In 1992, overruling Roe meant giving conservatives what they wanted; in 2021, overruling Roe can be framed as the “neutral” position. At times Justice Kavanaugh seemed to be openly setting up just such an opinion. This disagreement in strategy was the cause of some controversy earlier this year, with some originalists arguing the fetal personhood position was wrong in principle. Reliance on a self-limited strategy to merely overturn Roe left the Court with less room to maneuver 30 years ago. It might be that making fetal personhood a viable foil to the “neutrality” of silence at least gets us to neutrality this time, rather than the compromise that Roberts was probing.

On the other hand, even if the Court overrules Roe, we should not think the battle is over; rather, it will have only intensified. Yes, many states stand prepared to immediately ban or severely restrict abortion in such an eventuality. But many others, including such populous states as California, New York, and Illinois, stand to broaden access to abortion. The resulting patchwork quilt of laws, with women in red states trying to travel to blue states for abortions, will only provide justification for a federal solution by Congress, which will not be a total ban. In that regard, Republican Senator Susan Collins has already stated she would support a national codification of the Roe framework.

This is where the failure to truthfully reflect in conservative jurisprudence the moral monstrosity of abortion betrays its weakness. The progressive argument for abortion, with all its logical inconsistencies and the moral failure of arguing that a fetus is not worth protection, is at least not afraid to suggest other moral foundations. Progressives claim to protect the woman’s health and economic well-being, and these are indeed important, good things worth protecting—but not at the cost of destroying the unborn child’s life. For conservatives, the natural law should provide our own moral framework and legal foundation, but if we do not rely on it in defending the right of children to life in state legislatures and courts in years to come, we will not succeed in truly ending abortion in our country. Justice Kavanaugh suggested the Court should not be “forced . . . to pick sides” on the issue of abortion. The reasoning behind such a declared silence by the Supreme Court would not be a neutrality of moral indifference but rather moral cowardice, a refusal to pick a side reminiscent of the neutrals chasing the whirling banner in the vestibule of Dante’s Inferno.

In any case, as good as the originalist fetal personhood argument is, it only works at the federal level. While litigants in future disputes will not be prohibited from raising the unconstitutionality of an abortion provision on the grounds of the 14th Amendment, the Court’s refusal to pick it up here would not bode well for a federal constitutional challenge. In that broader 50 state fight following any overruling of Roe, the fight will be over state constitutional law in state legislatures and courthouses, who would be free to take either a stronger stance on abortion or grant a right to abortion in lieu of the lost federal right. Without the fetal personhood originalist argument readily usable in such contexts, the only morally persuasive way forward is not through a studied neutrality or reliance on state constitutional texts—it is through adherence to the foundations of natural law. If we do not rely on such a moral backbone in our own legal reasoning to combat the false morality of the progressive position, we may have sown the wind of one limited victory, only to reap the whirlwind of dozens of future defeats.

Yes, Courts Can Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Personhood For The Unborn

One of the objections to extending Fourteenth Amendment protections to unborn children is that it would be impossible for the Supreme Court and lower courts to meaningfully enforce such a ruling. Ed Whelan raised this objection in his initial response to John Finnis. Josh Craddock, Finnis, and Whelan published further replies and sur-replies. Most recently, Ramesh Ponnuru expressed his agreement with Finnis’s view on the Fourteenth Amendment, but argued that only Congress can enforce these protections. Finnis and Craddock convincingly explain, in broad strokes, how a Supreme Court ruling would translate into concrete legal protections for the unborn. While I largely agree with Craddock and Finnis, I would like to offer a few supplemental observations.

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A Crucial Experiment

Life and law being messy, there is rarely a crucial experiment available to test competing views. But in the recent controversy over the conservative legal movement’s strategy with respect to abortion, we have a test that is as good as we are likely to get: the pending certiorari petition in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which the lower courts struck down Mississippi’s ban on abortions after 15 weeks (with various exceptions). The cert petition squarely asks, in its first question presented, “[w]hether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional.” It is a head-on challenge to the Roe v. Wade framework.

A voice of the originalist establishment has said that “it is unlikely that there will ever be a more opportune vehicle” to reconsider Roe, and this is exactly right; Dobbs presents a choice opportunity. Four votes are needed to grant cert. There are now six GOP-appointed Justices on the Court, including three Trump appointees (Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, in order of appointment) who were openly screened by the Federalist Society. If four votes cannot be found among these six even to consider a square challenge to Roe, it seems well past time to take stock of the conservative legal movement’s approach to abortion, and well past time for some accountability — ideally self-imposed accountability — on the part of the movement’s leaders. Of course, even a grant, although welcome, will hardly guarantee success on the merits. But if a supermajority of GOP-appointed Justices are unwilling even to consider the issue, something has gone very wrong.

The Rule That Brought Us To This Place

John Finnis’s recent piece in First Things, “Abortion is Unconstitutional,” has sparked a great deal of controversy in conservative legal circles in the short time since it was published. In his piece, Finnis argues on originalist grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits abortion, and that the Supreme Court should therefore reverse Roe v. Wade and declare abortion unconstitutional. (This argument is similar to one given earlier by Josh Craddock.) Finnis argues that abortion is precluded by the original public meaning of “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or its Due Process Clause. One might be forgiven for thinking that such an argument, from such a man, in such a publication would be entirely uncontroversial in pro-life circles.

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Conflict of Laws and the Regulation of Public Health

In recent months religious believers in parts of the United States as well as western Europe have come to sense that public health regulations are being uniquely turned against them. In a Thanksgiving gift to religious believers in New York, late Wednesday evening the Supreme Court granted the request of the Diocese of Brooklyn (alongside a group representing Haredi Orthodox Jews) for injunctive relief from an executive order restricting occupancy at religious services to ten persons in COVID-19 “red zones” and twenty-five persons in “orange zones.” Catholics in France have not been so lucky, and there a national restriction limits religious services to thirty persons, even in France’s greatest cathedral churches. In both cases, governments claim to be fully committed to upholding liberty of religion as well as public interest writ large yet reach divergent conclusions.

This divergence points to a difficulty in one of the key concepts underlying this year’s restrictions on public activities—namely that of public order, which this year has taken the form of regulations made in the name of public health. In normal times, public order is a background condition assumed for the sake of going about the rest of one’s business. When the local fire department inspects a church building and concludes that four hundred people can safely fit within it, no one, least of all church authorities, bats an eye. In the church–state boundary dispute currently before us, however, religious congregations have faced severe adverse restrictions on their activities. And while Americans may be grateful that religious liberty jurisprudence worked in our favor this time, the same considerations—balancing public health and the demands of religious liberty—led to an adverse outcome in France, and one against which there is no appeal.

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“The Union Existed Before the Constitution”

​The Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. upheld the validity of a joint resolution (equivalent to a statute) authorizing the President, by proclamation, to make illegal the selling of arms to combatants in a conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay. Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court framed the issue by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the congressional delegation of authority would be invalid if it only involved internal affairs, and then asking whether the foreign relations context made a difference. His answer was that it made all the difference, for two main reasons. First, the context was one of concurrent presidential authority over external affairs, in which the President enjoys special powers to act as “sole organ of the federal government in foreign relations.” Second, the government as a whole possessed the relevant powers as inherent concomitants of external sovereignty. These points both implied that the standards of valid delegation were more capacious than in domestic affairs.

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Bostock and the tyranny of values

In a characteristically insightful essay, Vincent Clarke connects the textualism of Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County with the postmodern project of deconstruction, typified by the philosopher Jacques Derrida. Clarke observes that Derrida’s development of deconstruction was an attempt to make more effective Martin Heidegger’s attempt to demolish Western metaphysics. For Heidegger, metaphysics had to be destroyed to make room for a new approach to the experiences that became being. Derrida proposed a more effective mechanism for the same process. It is concerning, of course, from a theological and philosophical perspective to see postmodernism take hold in the Supreme Court. But there are other reasons for concern. Carl Schmitt’s 1959 lecture, The Tyranny of Values, argues that value philosophy runs to fill the void left by the destruction of metaphysics—with the gravest consequences for the state.

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The Deconstructionist Ghost in the Textualist Machine

Ius et Iustitium is happy to present this guest post by Vincent Clarke. Mr. Clarke is scholar of Lacanian psychoanalysis.


It is not often commented on, but judicial textualism bears many of the same hallmarks as philosophical postmodernism. When this is properly appreciated, many of the results of textualist legal reasoning can be better understood. Implicit in textualism are many of the same principles as postmodernism. Understood in this way, textualism operates as a sort of system of gears allowing postmodern culture to infiltrate the legal apparatus. That the founders of textualism may not have intended such a result is an historical irony, but does not change the ultimate result. Since postmodernism’s aim is ultimately to undermine the legal system, textualism thus becomes an instrument of subversion.

These questions have been brought into much sharper focus with the recent ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), where the Supreme Court expanded the protections offered in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include not just discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, but also ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation.’

Continue reading “The Deconstructionist Ghost in the Textualist Machine”

Ius et Iustitium is happy to present this guest post by Vincent Clarke. Mr. Clarke is scholar of Lacanian psychoanalysis.


It is not often commented on, but judicial textualism bears many of the same hallmarks as philosophical postmodernism. When this is properly appreciated, many of the results of textualist legal reasoning can be better understood. Implicit in textualism are many of the same principles as postmodernism. Understood in this way, textualism operates as a sort of system of gears allowing postmodern culture to infiltrate the legal apparatus. That the founders of textualism may not have intended such a result is an historical irony, but does not change the ultimate result. Since postmodernism’s aim is ultimately to undermine the legal system, textualism thus becomes an instrument of subversion.

These questions have been brought into much sharper focus with the recent ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), where the Supreme Court expanded the protections offered in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include not just discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, but also ‘gender identity’ and ‘sexual orientation.’

Continue reading “The Deconstructionist Ghost in the Textualist Machine”

DACA and Leadership

In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 591 U.S. ____ (2020), Chief Justice John Roberts struck down the actions of the Department of Homeland Security revoking the prior administrative actions popularly known as “DACA” (“Deferred Action  for Childhood Arrivals”). The DACA program, established in 2012 and expanded in 2014, allows individuals who came to the United States illegally as children to defer their deportation and, having done so, regularize their immigration status. The program came to include access to benefits. Shortly after President Trump took office in 2017, the Department of Homeland Security rescinded its DACA orders. The Supreme Court struck down these rescissions, not as exceeding the government’s power, but as failing to comply perfectly with the Administrative Procedure Act.

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McGirt and the Patchwork of American Sovereignties

The Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in McGirt v. Oklahoma, has garnered a flurry of breathless headlines and commentary describing the court’s decision as “reshap[ing] criminal justice in eastern Oklahoma by preventing state authorities from prosecuting Native Americans.”1  This statement is misleading, as Congress, in the Major Crimes Act of 1885, placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government the prosecution for felonies such as murder, assault, arson, burglary, or robbery committed by an Indian on reservation territory. Indeed, in affirming the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, the Supreme Court found that Indians “owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384, 6 S. Ct. 1109, 1114 (1886). What the majority opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by the so-called “liberal” justices, has done is actually quite “conservative.”

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