Catholic Constitutionalism: A Primer

What follows is a short talk I gave to students and young professionals from the Harvard-area community on the subject of “Catholic Constitutionalism.” It is intended merely a a brief primer and introduction to the issues, not as a comprehensive or theoretically sophisticated treatment. I nonetheless hope it is useful within its limits.


My talk today will be on Catholic Constitutionalism. (At a certain point, I will deliberately begin referring to this as “Catholic constitutionalism” with a small “c,” for reasons I will explain). One of my central questions will be whether there even is such a thing as Catholic Constitutionalism, to which I will answer: both no and yes. There is a sense in which there isn’t any such thing, and a sense in which there definitely is.


It won’t be a long talk, but it will have several different branches, so let me begin with a brief overview.
First I will say a bit about the Catholic doctrine as to the constitution of the temporal power. By constitution, I will always mean a small-c constitution in the classical sense, that is the total set of fundamental institutional and customary arrangements that structure public authority in a society. These may or may not be embodied in a large-C  “Constitution” in the modern sense, which is a single unitary written document that purports to lay forth the fundamental institutions in a text. In the classical sense, there is very much such a thing as the British constitution, although there is no single British Constitution in the modern sense. That is, the British constitution is often called an unwritten constitution, although a more accurate description is that it is an uncodified constitution. It is composed of a number of fundamental statutes that have constitutional force, like the Act of Union 1707, of foundational constitutional principles (“What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law”), and also of fundamental unwritten normative customs or as the British call them “conventions.” All this was true of the Roman constitution as well.


The Savoyard constitutional theorist Joseph De Maistre went further, in his Essay on the Generative Principle of Constitutions, and argued that there is in a sense no such thing as a written constitution. Constitutions are begotten, not made; grown, not engineered. On this view, although of course there are written things that purport to be constitutions, they at most restate antecedent unwritten law, and are not causally efficacious in structuring the small-c constitution — the actual operating rules and norms of a political order. We need not accept or reject De Maistre‘s argument for present purposes, however.


Secondly, I will turn to the constitution of the Church founded by Our Lord, known in one of its major branches as the Roman Catholic Church. Here I will not speak to the department of theology known as ecclesiology, according to which the Church is the mystical body of Christ. I’ll leave that to others who know far more theology than I do. I will simply offer a few remarks about the Church’s outward-facing fundamental institutional arrangements.


I should clarify another term here. When I refer to “the Church’s institutional arrangements,” I mean the institutional setup of the spiritual power. Properly speaking and more accurately, however, “the Church” encompasses both clergy and laity, both the spiritual and the temporal power. Indeed Catholic theology has always recognized a sphere within which the temporal power has legitimate autonomy to govern according to the virtue of prudence, directed to proper ends. One must not confuse or conflate (although many do) Catholic doctrine with Caesaro-Papism or heirocratic rule, both of which fuse the spiritual and temporal powers in different ways, either fully subjecting the spiritual to the temporal, or the temporal to the spiritual. That is not the Catholic view. The Catholic view is “Duo Sunt,” in the famous words of Pope St. Gelasius—there are two powers that rule, the spiritual and the temporal power, and one of the major issues of political theology is to get them into the right relationship. Here we have the issue of so-called integralism, better known as political Catholicism or simply, as Dignitatis Humanae described it, “the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” I mention this just for purposes of mapping the intellectual landscape, but integralism is not my subject today.


Third and finally, I’ll very briefly address the much-discussed question whether Catholic constitutionalism is compatible with liberalism, appropriately defined.

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A Crucial Experiment

Life and law being messy, there is rarely a crucial experiment available to test competing views. But in the recent controversy over the conservative legal movement’s strategy with respect to abortion, we have a test that is as good as we are likely to get: the pending certiorari petition in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which the lower courts struck down Mississippi’s ban on abortions after 15 weeks (with various exceptions). The cert petition squarely asks, in its first question presented, “[w]hether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional.” It is a head-on challenge to the Roe v. Wade framework.

A voice of the originalist establishment has said that “it is unlikely that there will ever be a more opportune vehicle” to reconsider Roe, and this is exactly right; Dobbs presents a choice opportunity. Four votes are needed to grant cert. There are now six GOP-appointed Justices on the Court, including three Trump appointees (Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, in order of appointment) who were openly screened by the Federalist Society. If four votes cannot be found among these six even to consider a square challenge to Roe, it seems well past time to take stock of the conservative legal movement’s approach to abortion, and well past time for some accountability — ideally self-imposed accountability — on the part of the movement’s leaders. Of course, even a grant, although welcome, will hardly guarantee success on the merits. But if a supermajority of GOP-appointed Justices are unwilling even to consider the issue, something has gone very wrong.

“What is the Common Good?”

Here’s my talk on “What is the Common Good?” for the new Oxford Law/Blackfriars project on Law and the Common Good. It’s not a talk on political theory or theology, but on constitutional and administrative law. Both Anglo-American and European law, past and present, are full of provisions referring to the “common good,” “general welfare,” “public interest,” “public order,” and so forth; these have to be construed some way or other. Thanks to my interlocutors, Profs. Ryan Meade and Chris Conway.

Monstrous Government

In his mini-treatise On the Government of a City, the great Italian lawyer-commentator Bartolus (Bartolo de Sasseferrato) begins with a fairly conventional typology of the six regime-types of classical constitutional theory. The city may be ruled by the many, the people; by the few, the optimates; or by one man. Any of these forms of rule may or may not be tyrannical. We thus have six categories, named respectively polity or regimen ad populum (good rule by the many) and democracy (bad or, in Bartolus’ preferred term, “perverse” rule by the many); aristocracy (good rule by the few) and oligarchy (bad); kingship (good rule by one) and tyranny (bad).

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Deference and Determination

In his remarkable and underappreciated book on Natural Law in Court, Dick Helmholz observes that when moderns turn to the subject of the relationship between natural law and positive law, they immediately focus on the question whether the former in some sense “trumps” the latter in cases of irreconcilable conflict. To the classical lawyer, however, that question was not central. To be sure, as early as the Institutes of Gaius it was said that “changes to civil law can take away rights belonging to civil law (jus civile), but not rights belonging to natural law (jus naturale)” (I.158). But natural law had many other roles detailed by Helmholz, roles much more central in actual practice, such as supplying interpretive principles and default rules for construing statutes, supplying principles of just procedure, and suggesting remedies.

More broadly, for the classical lawyer, the whole framework within which to discuss the relationship between natural and positive law was different, centering on their complementary roles rather than on potential conflict. The positive law, the ius civile, was understood as a set of rational ordinances promulgated by the public authority for the common good —that is, in order to give more specific content to the general principles of the natural law. In a famous passage, Aquinas distinguished two ways in which positive law might be derived from the natural law:

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A Euclid for Civil Liberties

In 1926, in a case called Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that is well-known to approximately all American law students, Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court to uphold a zoning scheme in Ohio. Drawing upon the deferential version of the police-power framework that, I have argued, embodies common-good constitutionalism within American law, Sutherland announced that “if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” Implicitly drawing upon the classical idea of determination, under which the public authority gives reasonable specifications to general legal principles, and also anticipating the famous “margin of appreciation” of human rights law, Sutherland added

it may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded, but those which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the same fate. But this is no more than happens in respect of many practice-forbidding laws which this Court has upheld, although drawn in general terms so as to include individual cases that may turn out to be innocuous in themselves…. The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity…. In the light of these considerations, we are not prepared to say that the end in view was not sufficient to justify the general rule of the ordinance, although some industries of an innocent character might fall within the proscribed class. It cannot be said that the ordinance in this respect passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.

Euclid thus illustrates the classical framework of deferential judicial review. Continue reading “A Euclid for Civil Liberties”

“The Union Existed Before the Constitution”

​The Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. upheld the validity of a joint resolution (equivalent to a statute) authorizing the President, by proclamation, to make illegal the selling of arms to combatants in a conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay. Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court framed the issue by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the congressional delegation of authority would be invalid if it only involved internal affairs, and then asking whether the foreign relations context made a difference. His answer was that it made all the difference, for two main reasons. First, the context was one of concurrent presidential authority over external affairs, in which the President enjoys special powers to act as “sole organ of the federal government in foreign relations.” Second, the government as a whole possessed the relevant powers as inherent concomitants of external sovereignty. These points both implied that the standards of valid delegation were more capacious than in domestic affairs.

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The Living Voice of the Law

In the very first book of the Digest of the Emperor Justinian, the great jurist Papinian lists the sources of the ius civile, the civil law of Rome, as “statutes, plebiscites, decrees of the Senate, imperial decrees, or authoritative juristic statements”—and then immediately adds that “praetorian law is that which the praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the ius civile.” Just as the ius civile is, in part, a determination or specification within reasoned boundaries of the more general principles of the natural law, so too the edicts of the praetors—high magistrates of Rome, just beneath the consuls—added specification to or adjusted the contours of the ius civile as necessary. Even more detailed specification could be added through the application of the edict to facts in particular cases by the courts. Non curat minima praetor became the maxim; the praetor does not attend to small details. The function of the praetor was to determine important questions of policy within the bounds of the ius civile, adjusting it to lived realities and changing circumstances. Each praetor’s edict was in force only for the praetor’s own term, but each successive officeholder tended to adapt the edict of his predecessor as a baseline, making adjustments at the margin. The result was a system in which, as the jurist Marcian put it, the edicts of the praetors were “the living voice of the ius civile.” Continue reading “The Living Voice of the Law”

Two Versions of Textualism

Vincent Clarke’s piece on textualism-as-postmodernism, while certainly full of interest, seems to me ultimately incomplete and in need of critical qualifications. The problem is that “textualism”—which Clarke never squarely defines—can be said in many ways, or at least two ways, of which Clarke discusses only one. The one Clarke discusses is indeed incompatible with the classical legal tradition. Another of those ways, however, is entirely compatible with the classical legal tradition; indeed it is Thomas Aquinas’ own view.

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